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I. INTRODUCTION
When a defective product has caused injury, the manufacturer will
often take remedial measures to prevent additional accidents. Reme-
dial measures include any subsequent "change, repair, or precaution",
that would prevent similar accidents in the future. Evidence of post-
accident safety measures can effectively persuade a jury of the manu-
facturer's liability.2 Yet this evidence is frequently barred from trial.
Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibits the admission of
subsequent remedial evidence to prove negligence or culpable con-
1. 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE: COMMEN-
TARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND FOR STATE COURTS 1
407[01], at 407.5 to 407-6 (1993).
2. SeeJohn M. Kobayashi, Subsequent Remedial Measures and Recall Letters and Notices,
in Product Liability 1989: Warnings, Instructions, and Recalls 503, 509 (PLI Litig. & Admin.
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 379, 1989).
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duct.5 Strict liability focuses on the product's fitness rather than the
manufacturer's negligent or culpable conduct.4 Despite the acknowl-
3. FED. R. EVID. 407. Subsequent Remedial Measures [also referred to as the "ex-
clusionary doctrine" for remedial measures] provides:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously,
would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent
measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connec-
tion with the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of
subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving own-
ership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or
impeachment.
Advisory Committee's Note
The rule incorporates conventional doctrine which excludes evidence of
subsequent remedial measures as proof of an admission of fault. The rule rests
on two grounds. (1) The conduct is not in fact an admission, since the con-
duct is equally consistent with injury by mere accident or through contributory
negligence. Or, as Baron Bramwell put it, the rule rejects the notion that
"because the world gets wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish before."
Hart v. Lancashire &Yorkshire Ry. Co., 21 L.T.R. N.S. 261, 263 (1869). Under
a liberal theory of relevancy this ground alone would not support exclusion as
the inference is still a possible one. (2) The other, and more impressive,
ground for exclusion rests on a social policy of encouraging people to take, or
at least not discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added
safety. The courts have applied this principle to exclude evidence of subse-
quent repairs, installation of safety devices, changes in company rules, and
discharge of employees, and the language of the present rule is broad enough
to encompass all of them. See Falknor, Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibil-
ity, 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 574, 590 (1956).
The second sentence of the rule directs attention to the limitations of the
rule. Exclusion is called for only when the evidence of subsequent remedial
measures is offered as proof of negligence or culpable conduct. In effect it
rejects the suggested inference that fault is admitted. Other purposes are,
however, allowable, including ownership or control, existence of duty, and fea-
sibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, and impeachment. 2 Wig-
more § 283; Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 1296. Two recent federal cases are
illustrative. Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961), an
action against an airplane manufacturer for using an allegedly defectively
designed alternator shaft which caused a plane crash, upheld the admission of
evidence of subsequent design modification for the purpose of showing that
design changes and safeguards were feasible. And Powers v. J.B. Michael &
Co., 329 F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 1964), an action against a road contractor for neg-
ligent failure to put out warning signs, sustained the admission of evidence
that defendant subsequently put out signs to show that the portion of the road
in question was under defendant's control. The requirement that the other
purpose be controverted calls for automatic exclusion unless a genuine issue
be present and allows the opposing party to lay the groundwork for exclusion
by making an admission. Otherwise the factors of undue prejudice, confusion
of issues, misleading the jury, and waste of time remain for consideration
under Rule 403.
For comparable rules, see Uniform Rule 51; California Evidence Code
§ 1151; Kansas Code of Civil Procedure § 60-451; New Jersey Evidence Rule
51.
Id. advisory committee's note.
4. ALVIN S. WEINSTEIN ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILrY AND THE REASONABLY SAFE PROD-
ucr: A GUIDE FOR MANAGEMENT, DESIGN, AND MARKETING § 1.4.1 (1978). Theories of
liability in a products liability action include negligence, strict liability (implied war-
ranty), and express warranty. Id. § 1.4.2. While negligence tests the conduct of the
defendant, strict liability (implied warranty) tests the quality of the product. Id. On the
[Vol. 20
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edged contrasts between negligence and strict liability, remedial evi-
dence is often routinely excluded from products liability trials where
either strict liability or negligence is at issue.5 The majority of Federal
Circuits have applied Rule 407 to strict liability claims.6 However, the
Eighth and Tenth Circuits have refused to limit the application of Rule
407 to claims based in negligence. 7 Despite years of criticism and de-
bate, the federal circuits continue to adhere to their respective philoso-
phies concerning the admissibility of remedial evidence in strict
liability actions.8
Proponents of excluding remedial evidence under Rule 407 argue
that admitting such evidence would discourage post-accident safety
measures.9 They further contend that the relevance and probative
value of remedial evidence is outweighed by problems of undue preju-
dice, misleading the jury, and confusing the issues.10 The Eighth and
other hand, express warranty and misrepresentation test the product against explicit
representations made by the manufacturer or seller. Id. § 1.4.3.
5. See cases cited infra notes 6-8.
6. See, e.g., Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 1986); Flaminio v.
Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 468-70 (7th Cir. 1984); Grenada Steel Indus. v. Ala-
bama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 886-88 (5th Cir. 1983); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658
F.2d 54, 59-60 (2nd Cir. 1981); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857 (4th Cir.
1980); Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230, 232 (6th Cir.
1980); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 91 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Roy v. Star
Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124,1134 (1st Cir. 1978) (excluding remedial evidence with no
discussion of Rule 407).
State courts are similarly split, with a nearly equal number of states excluding reme-
dial evidence as those that admit the evidence. See infra notes 97-103 and accompany-
ing text.
7. See, e.g., Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., 716 F.2d 1322, 1331 (10th Cir.
1983); Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 793 (8th Cir.
1977).
8. See, e.g., Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497, 506 (8th Cir. 1993) ("It is the law of
this circuit that Rule 407... does not preclude the introduction of such evidence in strict
liability cases.") (emphasis added); In rejoint E. Dist. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. v. Arm-
strong World Indus., 995 F.2d 343, 345 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that Rule 407 applies in
all products liability cases, whether brought under a theory of negligence or strict liabil-
ity); Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1275 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that Rule
407 applies in strict liability cases even though the language in the rule refers to negli-
gent or culpable conduct); Prentiss & Carlisle Co. v. Koehring-Waterous Div. of
Timberjack, Inc., 972 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1992) (reaffirming the use of Rule 407 in strict
product liability actions); Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 935 F.2d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir.
1991) (admitting remedial evidence in strict liability action, but holding that state law
applies in diversity actions); Probus v. K-Mart, Inc., 794 F.2d 1207, 1210 n.3 (7th Cir.
1986) (excluding remedial evidence in product liability case).
9. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note, supra note 3. See also Flaminio, 733
F.2d at 469 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that if evidence of remedial safety measures were
admissible to prove liability, the incentive to take such measures would be reduced).
10. See, e.g., Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 471-72 (stating that "distrust of juries' ability to
draw correct inferences from evidence of subsequent remedial measures" and the re-
sulting undue prejudice demonstrates the need for Rule 407).
1994]
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Tenth Circuits reject these arguments; they hold that blanket exclu-
sion of remedial evidence is unwarranted, preferring a case-by-case
analysis of admissibility."i
This Comment proposes that excluding remedial evidence in strict
liability actions contravenes public policy. Part II explores the develop-
ment of perspectives on admissibility of remedial evidence in cases of
strict products liability. Arguments favoring exclusion under Rule 407
are criticized in Part III. Rule 407 is better adapted to limit the use of
remedial evidence in cases advanced on a negligence theory rather
than in strict liability claims. Specifically, this section dispels the no-
tion that admitting remedial evidence will discourage correction of de-
fective products and illustrates how frequent circumvention of Rule
407 renders the rule virtually ineffective. Moreover, Part III examines
problems of relevancy, unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and
misleading the jury in both negligence and strict liability actions and
concludes that, when they arise in the latter, these problems are better
addressed through other evidentiary rules specifically designed for
these purposes. This Comment concludes by advocating greater con-
sistency in assessing the admissibility of remedial evidence in strict lia-
bility actions and suggests that this can be achieved by limiting Rule
407 to its original purview: negligence claims.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Development of Strict Liability
The law of products liability entered a period of rapid expansion in
the late nineteenth century12 and emerged as a hybrid of tort and con-
tract law.13 Initially, plaintiffs seeking to recover for injuries caused by
a defective product had to prove both negligence and privity of con-
11. See, e.g., Herndon, 716 F.2d at 1327 (arguing that the exclusion of remedial evi-
dence under Rule 407 contravenes the rationale of strict liability which is to place re-
sponsibility on the manufacturer, regardless of the reasonableness of design decisions);
Robbins, 552 F.2d at 793-94 (holding that the doctrine of strict liability "by its very na-
ture," does not include the elements of negligence or culpable conduct, thus remedial
evidence is relevant).
In the wake of Herndon, the Tenth Circuit determined that questions of admissibil-
ity of subsequent remedial measures are a matter of state law. Moe v. Avins Marcel
Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932 (10th Cir. 1984). The Tenth Circuit con-
tinues to defer to applicable state law where appropriate state law exists and is on point.
Whee/er, 935 F.2d at 1098.
12. See PAUL SHERMAN, PRODucTs LIABILrry FOR THE GENERAL PRACrITIONER § 7.02
(1981).
13. Id. The contract element required proof of breach of contract, while the tort
element required proof of negligence. Id.
[Vol. 20
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tract.14 Negligence required that the defendant's conduct created an
unreasonable risk that caused harm to the plaintiff.15 Privity of con-
tract limited recovery to situations in which the plaintiff had a direct
contractual relationship with the seller.16
The early twentieth century heralded rampant industrialization that
gave rise to popular demand for stronger protection from the growing
numbers of dangerous products entering the market.17 In response,
state courts began to abolish the privity of contract requirement; open-
ing a door of remedy for plaintiffs who were harmed by products that
they themselves did not actually purchase.'8
In 1913, the Washington Supreme Court abolished the privity of
contract requirement in Mazetti v. Armour & Co.,19 involving a restau-
rant patron who became ill after eating tainted meat.20 Recognizing
the dramatic change in social conditions, the court held that a manu-
facturer may be directly liable to third persons, despite lack of privity,
where "the existing rule does not square withjustice."21 This rejection
of privity of contract requirements in food products cases gave rise to
an "implied warranty"22 of safety that subsequently was extended to
many other dangerous products. 23
The next major advance in the development of strict liability did not
occur until 1960 when the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Hen-
14. Id. § 7.01; see also DebraJ. Hackford, The Case For the Renovated Repair Rule: Ad-
mission of Evidence of Subsequent Repairs Against the Mass Producer in Strict Products Liability,
29 AM. U. L. REv. 135 n.2 (1979).
15. WErNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1.4.1.
16. See id. §§ 1.5-1.6. Thus, if a buyer sustained injuries from a negligently manu-
factured product, there was no cause of action against the manufacturer unless the
buyer actually purchased the product from the manufacturer. See SHERMAN, supra note
12.
17. See SHERMAN, supra note 12, § 7.03.
18. Id.
19. 135 P. 633 (Wash. 1913).
20. Id. at 633-34. In the center of the package was a "foul, filthy, nauseating and
poisonous substance," which was served to one of the patrons. Id. at 633.
21. Id. at 636. Compare Mazetti, 135 P. at 635 (stating that the manufacturer's obli-
gations should not be based on privity alone, but on the demands of social justice) with
Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 90 S.W.2d 445, 450 (Mo. Ct. App.
1936) (stating that if privity of contract is required, then, under circumstances of mod-
ern merchandising, "privity of contract exists in the consciousness and understanding
of all right-thinking persons").
22. The doctrine of "implied warranty" is founded in contract law and requires that
the plaintiff acts in reliance upon some representation, assurance, or undertaking by
the defendant. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 97, at 691 (5th ed. 1984).
23. Other products protected by the implied warranty of safety included cosmetics,
building materials, automobiles, tires, airplanes, golf-carts, water heaters, and insecti-
cides. Id. § 97, 690 & n.8.
1994]
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ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc.24 In Henningsen, an action for breach of
implied warranty, an automobile driver was injured when the steering
in her ten-day old car malfunctioned.25 The New Jersey Supreme
Court ruled that privity of contract should no longer be a requirement
for liability where a dangerous product causes harm. 26 Effectively, the
Henningsen court held the manufacturer liable for selling a defective
dangerous product despite lack of privity and despite lack of fault.2
7
Thereby, the general form of strict liability was born;28 its recognition
as a distinct claim, however, was still developing.
The legal community quickly embraced the doctrine of implied war-
ranty.2 9 Several jurisdictions adopted the rationale supporting Hen-
ningsen and applied the doctrine to a variety of products. 30 Shortly
thereafter, the implied warranty doctrine was codified in the Uniform
Sales Act,3 1 which was later rewritten as Section 2-314 of the Uniform
Commercial Code.32
24. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). Many consider Henningsen to be a motivating force in
the movement toward strict liability. See William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 791 (1966).
25. Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 75.
26. Id. at 84. The court held that:
[U]nder modern marketing conditions, when a manufacturer puts a new auto-
mobile in the stream of trade and promotes its purchase by the public, an
implied warranty that it is reasonably suitable for use as such accompanies it
into the hands of the ultimate purchaser. Absence of agency between the
manufacturer and the dealer who makes the ultimate sale is immaterial.
Id.
27. See, e.g., WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1.6, at 14.
28. Strict liability has been referred to as "liability without fault." KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 22, § 99, at 695.
In strict liability, the plaintiff is not required to impugn the conduct of the
maker or other seller but he is required to impugn the product. Under [the
Restatement (Second) of Torts] Section 402A it is said that the product must
be in "a defective condition unreasonably dangerous." This simply means that
the product must be defective in the kind of way that subjects persons or tangi-
ble property to an unreasonable risk of harm.
Id. A product is defective and unreasonably dangerous if it contains a manufacturing
defect at the time it is sold, fails to provide adequate warnings of the risks and hazards
involved with the product, or is defectively designed. Id.
29. See id. § 97 at 690. "What followed was the most rapid and altogether spectacu-
lar overturn of an established rule in the entire history in the law of torts." Id.
30. See, e.g., McQuade v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 190 F. Supp. 252, 254 (D. Conn.
1960) (finding insecticide manufacturer liable for breach of warranty despite lack of
privity); Simpson v. Powered Prods. of Mich., Inc., 192 A.2d 555, 560 (Conn. 1963)
(finding golf-cart manufacturer liable for breach of warranty); Deveny v. Rheem Mfg.
Co., 319 F.2d 124, 130 (2nd. Cir. 1963) (finding breach of warranty liability against
manufacturer of hot waterheater).
31. THE REvISED UNIFORM SALES ACT: REPORT AND SECOND DRAFT (Nat'l. Conf. of
Comm'rs. on Unif. State Laws 1941).
32. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1992) provides:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is
[Vol. 20
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As the contractual basis of product liability law eroded, so too did
the requirements based in tort. Where dangerous products were in-
volved, courts began to abandon the theory of implied warranty, recog-
nizing instead a theory of strict liability in tort.33 For the first time,
courts were willing to impose liability without evidence of breach of
implied warranty or negligence.3 4
The courts first recognized strict liability as a distinct claim in Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,35 in which the plaintiff was seriously
injured by a piece of wood thrown from a lathe.36 The California
Supreme Court adopted strict liability for defective products that cause
harm.37 Although the Greenman decision reflected a controversial ap-
proach, it was supported by strong social policy of protecting consum-
ers from dangerous products. 3 8 Other jurisdictions adopted strict
a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the
serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises
or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description;
and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement
may require; and
(f) conform to the promise or affirmations of fact made on the container
or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties
may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
Id.
33. Several policy reasons justified a departure from liability based on warranty.
Manufacturers are better able to bear the costs of product injury. Escola v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 150 P2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944). Strict liability promotes accident preven-
tion. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1041-42 (Or. 1974). Also, costs of
litigation and difficulty in proving negligence or fault support strict liability recovery.
Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 963 (Md. 1976).
34. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring) (stating that even in the absence of negligence, "absolute liability" should
be imposed for defective products that cause harm).
35. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
36. Id. at 898.
37. Id. Justice Traynor stated, "A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an
article [the manufacturer] places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." Id.
at 900.
38. As Justice Traynor noted, the purpose of strict liability "is to insure that the
costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturer that
put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless
to protect themselves." Id. at 901.
19941
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liability in rapid succession.39 Shortly thereafter, the doctrine was in-
corporated into the Restatement of Torts.40
Modern strict liability applies to actions involving dangerous defec-
tive products that result from defective design, production flaws, or
failure to warn.4 1 Claimants injured by a dangerous defective product
may seek damages under any one or a combination of three theories:
(a) negligence in tort; (b) strict liability for breach of express or im-
plied warranty; or (c) strict liability in tort.4 2 Rule 407's exclusion of
subsequent remedial evidence generally is applied to theories of negli-
gence and strict liability in torts.
43
B. Development of Rule 40744
In 1892, nearly seventy years before the development of strict liabil-
ity, the United States Supreme Court ruled that evidence of post-acci-
dent remedial measures cannot be used to prove negligence. 4 5 In
Columbia & Puget Sound R.R. v. Hawthorne, in which a worker was in-
39. See FRANK J. VANDALL, STRICT LIABILITY- LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 8-9
(1989). Strict liability in tort "swept the country." KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, § 98, at
694.
40. After Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) was de-
cided, and shortly before the Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897
(Cal. 1962) decision, the American Law Institute was in the process of drafting the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. SHERMAN, supra note 12, at 194-95. A tentative draft
of the 1965 RESTATEMENT was published in 1961. Id. at 195. The final version of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
41. KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, § 98, at 694-98.
42. Id. at 694.
43. See, e.g., Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 471-73 (7th Cir. 1984)
(applying Rule 407 to both negligence and strict liability claims). Rule 407 does not
generally apply to actions based solely on a breach of warranty claim. See R.W. Murray
Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 758 F.2d 266, 274-75 (8th Cir. 1985) (refusing to apply
Rule 407 to breach of warranty claims).
44. Federal Rule of Evidence 407, Subsequent Remedial Measures, addresses the
admissibility of evidence of remedial actions taken by a party after an "event" causes an
injury. FED. R. EvD. 407, supra note 3.
45. Columbia & Puget Sound R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202 (1892).
[Vol. 20
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jured by a pulley when it unscrewed from a machine and fell on him,46
the Supreme Court held that evidence of subsequently added safety
features was inadmissible to show fault.47
The Court reasoned that such evidence is irrelevant since "taking...
precautions against the future is not to be construed as an admission
of responsibility for the past."48 In addition to being irrelevant, the
Court noted that this type of evidence would confuse the issues and be
prejudicial to the defendant.49
In the wake of Hawthorne, the common law systematically began to
exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures in negligence ac-
tions.50 The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in 1975 and were
drafted as a codification of common law tradition.5' Thus, Rule 407
embodies the traditional doctrine of excluding remedial measures to
show fault.52 Neither the language of the rule nor the advisory com-
mittee's report, however, provide any guidance about its applicability
to strict liability actions.53
C. Modern Application of Rule 407
Despite the clear language of Rule 407, which provides that reme-
dial measures are not admissible to prove "negligence or culpable con-
46. Id. at 202.
47. Id. at 207.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 208. In reaching its decision, the court relied on Morse v. Minneapolis &
St. Louis Ry., 30 Minn. 465 (1883). In Morse, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
remedial evidence is irrelevant for demonstrating negligence and that allowing such
evidence would "hold out an inducement for continued negligence." Id. at 468-69.
Confusion of the issues is addressed by FED. R. EVID. 403. See infra note 196. Argua-
bly, remedial evidence can be confusing when ajury may be uncertain whether to focus
its attention solely on circumstances of the accident, or if subsequent occurrences also
play a part in the determination of liability. Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., 716
F.2d 1322, 1327 (10th Cir. 1983).
50. See, e.g., Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Ponn, 191 F.2d 682, 692 (6th Cir. 1911) (refus-
ing to admit post-accident evidence that defendant installed a new turntable sufficiently
long enough to accommodate engines); Southern Pac. Co. v. Hall, 100 F.2d 760, 767-68
(9th Cir. 1900) (refusing to admit evidence of a post-accident repair on the basis that
such evidence could be improperly perceived as an admission of past negligence); Bar-
ber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Odasz, 60 F.2d 71, 73-74 (2d Cir. 1894) (excluding testimony
of post-accident improvements in negligence claim).
51. See Barbara S. Goss, Note, Subsequent Remedial Measures in Strict Liability: Later
Opinions as Evidence of Defects in Earlier Reasoning, 32 CArH. U. L. REv. 895, 899 (1983).
Rule 407 was adopted without challenge because it was essentially a codification of the
common law rule of excluding remedial evidence to show negligence or fault. Id. at
896.
52. FED. R. Evw. 407 advisory committee's note, supra note 3.
53. The rule incorporates conventional doctrine which excludes evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures as proof of an admission of fault. See id.
1994l
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duct,"54 the exclusionary doctrine has been applied in cases based on
strict liability as well as in cases of negligence.55 Some jurisdictions,
however, have declined to apply the Rule 407 exclusion where strict
liability is at issue.5
6
The leading and most frequently cited case allowing evidence of re-
medial measures is Ault v. International Harvester Co.,57 decided several
months prior to the enactment of Rule 407. In Ault, the passenger in a
motor vehicle sustained injuries when the vehicle, traveling fifteen
miles per hour, went off the road and plunged to the bottom of a can-
yon.5 8 The plaintiff, asserting that a defectively designed gearbox had
caused the accident,59 attempted to introduce evidence of a subse-
quent design change to demonstrate a strict liability design defect.6 0
The California Supreme Court held that the remedial evidence exclu-
sion was not applicable in actions against manufacturers based on strict
liability.6 1
The Ault-court was unwilling to expand the definition of "culpable
conduct" to encompass strict liability,62 reasoning that if the legisla-
ture had intended to include non-blameworthy conduct, it would have
used an expression less related to affirmative fault.6 3 Moreover, the
court stated that the rule supporting the exclusion was intended to
codify well-settled common law; the rationale being that evidence of
post-accident remedial measures was irrelevant to theories of negli-
54. FED. R. EvID. 407.
55. See, e.g., Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124, 1134 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding
that subsequent remedial measures are inadmissible in strict liability, but failing to dis-
cuss Rule 407).
56. E.g., Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1150-51 (Cal. 1975)
(distinguishing between use of evidence of remedial measures to prove negligence and
use of the evidence to establish defect, which would be admissible in strict liability
cases).
57. 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1975).
58. Id. at 1150.
59. Id.
60. Id. The plaintiff claimed that the accident resulted from metal fatigue in the
gearbox. Id. To support this claim, he sought to introduce evidence that the manufac-
turer, three years after the accident, changed the composition of the faulty gearbox
from aluminum to iron. Id.
61. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Cal. 1975). The Ault
court analyzed the application of section 1151 of the California Evidence Code. Sec-
tion 1151 provides: "When, after the occurrence of an event, remedial or precautionary
measures are taken, which, if taken previously, would have tended to make the event
less likely to occur, evidence of such subsequent measures is inadmissible to prove neg-
ligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1151
(West 1966). The provision is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 407, and thus, the
same policy analysis applies. See supra note 3.
62. Ault, 528 P.2d at 1150-51.
63. Id. at 1151.
[Vol. 20
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gence.64 The court further reasoned that, although the policy to en-
courage post-accident safety measures is necessary in negligence
actions, the policy has no comparable role within the scope of strict
products liability.65 Specifically, mass producers of products would not
likely fail to implement safety features, thereby risking additional law-
suits and a tarnished public image, solely out of fear that such evidence
would be used against them in the initial lawsuit.66
Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n 67 was the first strict lia-
bility case to specifically test Rule 407. In that 1977 case, a farmer sued
the manufacturer of a cattle protein supplement when his calves died
after ingesting the product.6 8 After the accident, the manufacturer
sent consumers a notice warning that the feed supplement may be dan-
gerous if used within one month of transporting and vaccinating
cattle. 69
The farmer claimed strict liability and sought to introduce the letter
to demonstrate that the product was unreasonably dangerous and de-
fective. 70 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit admitted the evidence on the
ground that strict liability, by its nature, does not contain the elements
of negligence required for exclusion under Rule 407.71 The court, re-
lying upon Ault, ruled that a post-accident remedial warning was ad-
missible in a strict liability claim. 72
Despite the apparent lack of ambiguity in the Robbins decision, fed-
eral circuit courts have inconsistently applied Rule 407 to subsequent
product liability actions.73 The first occasion of inconsistency occurred
in 1979, when the Third Circuit decided that Rule 407 does apply to
strict liability claims. In Knight v. Otis Elevator Co.,74 an employee was
injured when a malfunctioning elevator door struck her.75 The prem-
ise of that strict liability claim was that the elevator controls protruded
from the wall unguarded, causing accidental activation of the doors.76
The employee sought to introduce evidence that the elevator company
installed guards on its elevator systems after the accident to prevent
future accidents. 77 On review, the Third Circuit found no abuse of
64. Id..
65.. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Cal. 1975).
66. Id. at 1152.
67. 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1977).
68. Id. at 790.
69. Id. at 792.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 793-94.
72. Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 793-94 (8th Cir.
1977).
73. See cases cited supra notes 6-8.
74. 596 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979).
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discretion for excluding evidence of a subsequently installed safety de-
vice.78 The court relied on the trial court's finding that the evidence
was prejudicial and did not fall under any exception to Rule 407.
79
The court excluded the evidence without distinguishing strict liability
actions from actions claiming negligence, nor did it address the issue
of fault or culpable conduct.80 Regardless of these notable omissions,
the majority of federal courts have followed the Third Circuit's inter-
pretation of Rule 407.81
In 1984, the Seventh Circuit attempted to expound a rationale for its
application of the Rule 407 exclusion to strict liability claims. In
Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co.,82 a motorcyclist was rendered paraplegic
after losing control of a wobbling motorcycle.8 3 The plaintiff claimed
that his injuries resulted from both a defective design and the failure
of the manufacturer to warn of the motorcycle's propensity to wob-
ble.8 4 The cyclist sought to introduce blueprints showing that the mo-
torcycle manufacturer, in an effort to reduce the dangerous wobble,
subsequently modified the front wheel forks making them two millime-
ters thicker.8 5
In its analysis, the Flaminio court asserted the underlying purpose of
Rule 407: the promotion of safety.8 6 If remedial measures were admis-
sible as evidence of liability, the court noted, there would be no incen-
tive for a manufacturer to make repairs after an accident or to take
steps to remedy the danger.8 7 However immoral it might seem, a man-
ufacturer may avoid taking remedial measures that would prevent fur-
ther accidents; the likelihood that another accident will occur is
actually smaller than the likelihood that the victim will sue the manu-
facturer and use evidence of remedial measures with devastating re-
suits.8 8 Relying upon this policy rationale, the court held that Rule 407
is applicable in strict liability claims.8 9
78. Id. at 91-92.
79. Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 91-92 (3d Cir. 1979). Specifically, the
court held that unless feasibility of the safety measure was controverted, the evidence
was prejudicial and properly excluded under Rule 407. Id.
80. Id.
81. See cases cited supra note 6.
82. 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984).
83. Id. at 465.
84. Id. at 466. Failure to warn in a strict liability claim results from a duty to warn
where the manufacturer has, or should have, knowledge of a dangerous use of its prod-
uct. Id. at 466-68. In this case, there was evidence that the manufacturer knew of the
motorcycle's propensity to wobble. Id. at 468.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 469.
87. Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1984).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 469-70.
(V/ol. 20
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The Tenth Circuit has disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's interpre-
tation of Rule 407, adhering instead to the position of the Eighth Cir-
cuit and the rationale supporting the Ault decision.90 In Herndon v.
Seven BarFlying Service,91 a student pilot was killed, allegedly as a result
of a faulty flight control switch.92 After the accident, the switch manu-
facturer issued a service bulletin advising that the switch had a ten-
dency to stick.93 The owners of the aircraft then modified the switch.
The pilot's widow brought a strict liability action and sought to intro-
duce evidence of the manufacturer's advisory bulletin. The court held
that the evidence had been properly admitted,94 reasoning that, as a
matter of policy, application of Rule 407 "is inappropriate in actions
against defendants who are pursuing activities for which society has
decided to assess strict liability."95 The court also noted that "there is
no evidence which shows that manufacturers even know about the evi-
dentiary rule [Rule 407] or change their behavior because of it."96
Several states have adopted the position of the Eighth and Tenth
Circuits, relying upon the Ault rationale, admitting evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures in products liability cases based on strict lia-
bility.97 Maine, for example, freely admits remedial evidence not only
90. See Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1975).
91. 716 F.2d 1322, 1327 (10th Cir. 1983).
92. Id. at 1324.
93. Id. at 1326-27.
94. Id.
95. Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., 716 F.2d 1322, 1327 (10th Cir. 1983). The
Herndon court noted that, in strict liability jurisdictions, society has decided to place
"responsibility for the potential losses from producing an unsafe airplane with the man-
ufacturer, regardless of the reasonableness of the manufacturer's design decisions." Id.
The court also acknowledged important differences between the doctrines of negli-
gence and strict liability. Where concerns of relevance or undue prejudice arise in the
latter, Rules 401 and 403 should be applied rather than Rule 407. If the evidence is
relevant and nonprejudicial, Rule 407 should not exclude it; doing so "would thwart the
policies that underlie strict liability by an illogical imposition of a negligence-based rule
of evidence." Id. (citing Friederichs v. Huebner, 329 N.W.2d 890, 903 (Wis. 1983)).
96. Herndon, 716 F.2d at 1328.
[S] everal courts have observed that it is unrealistic to think a tort feasor would
risk innumerable additional lawsuits by foregoing necessary design changes
simply to avoid the possible use of those modifications as evidence by persons
who have already been injured. Furthermore, insurors [sic] would not tolerate
their insured manufacturers refusing to take remedial measures. Governmen-
tal agencies, as well as juries contemplating punitive damage claims, would
also be unlikely to approve of such callous behavior.
Id. at 1327-28.
97. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Fulkerson, 812 S.W.2d 119, 126 (Ky. 1991)(holding
that proof of post-accident design change is probative evidence of the quality of the
earlier design); Figgie Int'l Inc. v. Tognocchi, 624 A.2d 1285, 1292 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1993) (admitting post-accident safety bulletin to show that standard of care had not
been met at the time of accident); Tune v. Synergy Gas Corp., No. 18273, 1993 WL
309055, at *8 (Mo. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 1993) (providing that evidence of subsequent
remedial measures is admissible in showing the propane involved in the accident was
1994]
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in strict liability cases, but in negligence cases as well. 98 At the other
end of the evidentiary spectrum are the states that exclude remedial
evidence in strict liability actions.99 Arizona and Nebraska are bound
by express statute to exclude evidence of subsequent remedial meas-
ures in all product liability actions.100
Most cases involving the application of the exclusionary rule to sub-
sequent remedial evidence are diversity actions, and thus, arise in fed-
eral court.10 1 In such cases, Federal Evidence Rule 407, rather than
state law, generally applies since it can be rationally classified as proce-
unreasonably dangerous); Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 808 P.2d 522, 526 (Nev. 1991)
(holding that evidence of post-manufacturer design changes are admissible in strict
liability claims); See also TEX. R. Crv. EVID. 407(a) (providing that evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures is admissible in products liability cases based on strict
liability).
98. ME. R. EVID. 407(a). This statute has been construed to allow the admission of
subsequent remedial evidence "for any purpose including to prove negligence." Marcia
L. Finkelstein, Comity and Tragedy: The Case of Rule 407, 38 VAND. L. REv. 585, 611
(1985).
99. See, e.g., Molino v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 617 A.2d 1235 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1992); Benson v. Tennessee Valley Elec. Coop., Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,622
(Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1993); See also TENN. R. EVID. 407. "[E]vidence of the subse-
quent remedial measures is not admissible to prove strict liability." Id.
100. The Arizona statute provides:
In any product liability action, the following shall not be admissible as direct evidence of
a defect
1) Evidence of advancement or changes in the state of the art subsequent
to the time the product was first sold by the defendant.
2) Evidence of any change made in the design or methods of manufacturing or
testing the product or any similar product subsequent to the time the product was first
sold by the defendant.
ARiz. REv. STAT. § 12-686(2) (1956) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Nebraska statute
provides:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would
have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures
is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with
the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent
measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, con-
trol, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeach-
ment. Negligence or culpable conduct, as used in this rule, shall include, but not be
limited to, the manufacturer or sale of a defective product.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-407 (1989) (emphasis added).
101. Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen
Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning"Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee on the
Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
857, 894 (1992).
Diversity of jurisdiction is defined as follows:
A phrase used with reference to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, which,
under U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, extends to cases between citizens of different
states, designating the condition existing when the party on one side of a law-
suit is a citizen of one state, and the party on the other side is a citizen of
another state, or between a citizen of a state and an alien.
BLACK's LAW DicrioNARY 477 (6th ed. 1990).
[Vol. 20
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dural by nature.1 02 However, where state legislation contains specific
exclusionary provisions for subsequent repairs, the state statutes may
apply due to their substantive nature. 105
III. DISCUSSION: THE CASE FOR EXEMPTING STRIC-r LIABILITY CLAIMS
Evidence of remedial measures should not be excluded under Rule
407 in strict product liability actions. The policy argument on which
exclusion is based-that admitting remedial evidence would provide a
disincentive for manufacturers to repair defective products-is largely
unsupported.04 Manufacturers that place defective and dangerous
products in the stream of commerce have such substantial incentives
to correct their products that the Federal Rules of Evidence, without
more, are unlikely to deter remedial measures. In the rare event that
manufacturers do consider Rule 407 in their decisions whether to re-
pair unsafe products, the practical ease of avoiding exclusion under
exceptions to the rule undermines certainty and reliance on its
applicability.
The policies and purposes behind Rule 407 best serve actions that
involve negligence.' 05 Negligence differs from strict liability in sub-
stantial ways.1 06 Defendants in negligence actions need to be pro-
102. Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1277 (3d Cir. 1992). The Kelly court
held that Rule 407, and not state law, must be applied as long as the rule "can rationally
be viewed as procedural." Id. (citing Salas by Salas v. Wang, 846 F.2d 897, 906 (3d Cir.
1988)). Under the United States Constitution, federal courts must apply the substan-
tive rules prescribed by state law. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). The
United States Supreme Court has ruled that in diversity cases, the Federal Rules of
Evidence will apply in the "uncertain area between substance and procedure" where the
applicable rule is capable of being classified as either. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,
472 (1965).
Some courts also have determined that substantive judgment is entwined in Rule
407 application. See, e.g., Fasanaro v. Mooney Aircraft Corp., 687 F. Supp. 482, 485
(N.D. Cal. 1988) (reasoning that if courts allow evidence of subsequent remedial meas-
ures, defendants will be allowed to rebut the evidence, slowing the trial process consid-
erably). The Fasanaro court also stated that Rule 407 reflects the procedural goal of
judicial economy. Id. at 463. But see Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d 1404 (10th
Cir. 1988) (applying state law in diversity action). In Wheeler, the court ruled that per-
mitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures is based on policy considerations of
encouraging manufacturers to take remedial measures without fear that these measures
will be used against them at trial, not on the relevancy of the remedial measures. Id. at
1410.
103. 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 1, 1 407[03], at 407-25 to 407-26.
104. See Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Cal. 1975) (rea-
soning that product manufacturers would not fail to implement safety features if doing
so would risk additional lawsuits or a tarnished public image).
105. See FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note, supra note 3. The note states
that the rule incorporates the conventional doctrine of excluding remedial evidence to
show "fault." Id. However, fault need not be demonstrated in a strict liability claim. See
KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, § 75, at 534.
106. See discussion infra part III.C.
19941
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tected from irrelevant and prejudicial evidence. Although defendants
in strict liability claims deserve the similar protection, the probative
value of remedial evidence generally outweighs any prejudicial effect
or concern of relevancy.
Moreover, the express language of Rule 407 unambiguously limits its
application to negligence actions.10 7 Finally, social policies that have
supported strict liability since the theory's inception mandate admis-
sion of remedial evidence in such claims.
A. Admitting Remedial Evidence Will Not Deter Safety Measures
Those who advocate excluding remedial evidence argue that admis-
sion of the evidence would discourage otherwise reasonable people
from taking steps to increase safety108 This argument, based on early
common law decisions involving negligence, is speculative at best.1 09
There is no evidence that admitting remedial evidence deters manu-
facturers from correcting products that are known to be defective or
dangerous.110
Lack of evidentiary support is but one of several flaws in the deter-
rence theory. The notion that admitting remedial evidence will dis-
courage post-accident repairs assumes that manufacturers know and
understand the effect and applicability of Rule 407.111 This assump-
tion is both unsupported and unrealistic.112 Decisions affecting the
manufacturing process are made by management and engineering spe-
107. See supra note 3. The rule states that "evidence of the subsequent measures is
not admissible to prove negligence .... " FED. R. EvID. 407.
108. FED. R. EvD. 407 advisory committee's note, supra note 3. The advisory commit-
tee's note states that "[t]he other, and more impressive, ground for exclusion rests on a
social policy of encouraging people to take, or at least not discouraging them from
taking, steps in furtherance of added safety." Id.
109. E.g., Morse v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., 30 Minn. 465, 468-69 (1883) (rea-
soning that allowing remedial evidence in an action based in negligence "holds out an
inducement for continued negligence").
110. See Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 887 (5th Cir.
1983) (noting that a disincentive for manufacturers to correct defective products is
"based on little direct evidence," but holding that Rule 407 nevertheless applies to strict
liability).
111. See Friederichs v. Huebner, 329 N.W.2d 890, 902 (Wis. 1983) (expressing skep-
ticism that defendants even know about the rule excluding subsequent remedial meas-
ures). At least one court has merely assumed that large manufacturers defending
against products liability suits, "must know all about [Rule 407]." Flaminio v. Honda
Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 470 (7th Cir. 1984).
112. Kobayashi, supra note 2.
The exclusionary rule may well be at least only marginally justifiable on the
basis of the "social policy of nondeterrence." The presumptively controlling
basic historical assumption that a person will refuse to take remedial measures
because his subsequent corrective actions might be used in a future lawsuit
does not nowadays seem to bear much of a relationship to reality. Even where
that person might know of an earlier defect or accident related to a defect, it is
highly unlikely that such a person or manufacturer would deliberately fail to
[Vol. 20
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cialists. It is unlikely that a concept so foreign to the production pro-
cess as a federal evidentiary rule would have any impact on the
methods and specifications by which a product is manufactured.,13
Even assuming that the manufacturer contemplates Rule 407, the ef-
fect of the rule, with its many exceptions and inconsistencies, is incapa-
ble of being predicted with any certainty.114
Assuming further that a manufacturer has accurate knowledge of
the effect and applicability of Rule 407, a responsible manufacturer is
unlikely to forego implementing necessary safety measures that would
decrease the risk of additional injuries to the consumer.115 Manufac-
turers intentionally rejecting reasonable remedial measures would be
faced with evidence of previous accidents to demonstrate their knowl-
edge of a product's dangerous condition.11 6 Evidence that a manufac-
turer knew that a product was prone to cause injury and nonetheless
neglected to implement remedial safety measures generally will tip the
judicial scales in favor of the plaintiff. Therefore, admitting remedial
evidence in strict liability claims will likely encourage, rather than dis-
courage, the repair of defective products; otherwise the manufacturer
may be faced with additional future plaintiffs and a more difficult bur-
den of persuasion.1
1 7
take some corrective action merely to come within the scope of an exclusion-
ary evidentiary rule....
Id. at 545; see also Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., 716 F.2d 1322, 1327 (10th Cir.
1983) ("[I]t is unrealistic to think a tort feasor would risk innumerable additional law-
suits by foregoing necessary design changes simply to avoid the possible use of those
modifications as evidence by persons who have already been injured.").
113. See 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 1, 1 407[2], at 407-15; see also Traylor v.
Husqvarna Motor, 988 F.2d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 1993) (expressing "doubt that a producer
will often be deflected from making improvements by fear about the consequences to
his litigating position in hypothetical future cases-cases especially hypothetical be-
cause no accident has yet occurred.").
114. When determining the applicability and effect of Rule 407 on a decision to
remedy a dangerous or defective product, the manufacturer must consider the differ-
ing applications of the rule in every federal and state jurisdiction to which the product
may be subjected. The several exceptions to the exclusionary doctrine would need to
be considered as well.
115. SeeAult v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Cal. 1975) (stating
that the policy of encouraging repairs by excluding remedial evidence in a strict liability
claim is of "doubtful validity" because "it is in the economic self interest of a manufac-
turer to improve and repair defective products").
116. Id. See also Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding
that a remedial measure is admissible as proof of knowledge of a dangerous condition
or feasibility of precautionary measures).
117. "If, nevertheless, manufacturers must pay for all harm proximately caused by
their dangerously defective products, they are likely to be more deeply and continu-
ously concerned with safety, and, as a result, allocate resources to research and testing
that will improve safety quality control and reduce dangerous design defects." CLAR-
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The possibility of extensive punitive damages is an additional deter-
rent to the manufacturer that fails to implement remedial measures.1 18
Juries are apt to impose guilt of willful and callous disregard for
human life on any manufacturer that continued to foist a dangerous
product with a known defect on the marketplace. 1 9
Practical implications beyond the judgments of unsympathetic juries
dispel the myth that admitting remedial evidence will discourage re-
pair of dangerous products. For example, insurers would not likely
tolerate the insured manufacturer's failure to correct defects in a dan-
gerous product.1 2 0 Such neglect would needlessly expose the manu-
facturer's insurer to additional injury claims that would continue
unabated until the product was eventually remedied. Moreover, gov-
ernmental agencies are also likely to condemn inaction after a product
causes harm and may mandate that necessary remedial steps be
taken.121
The specter of severe economic implications is perhaps the most im-
portant and realistic deterrent to manufacturers that might fail to cor-
rect a dangerous or defective product. Repairing the product is often
less costly than litigating later claims involving the defective prod-
uct.122 Furthermore, consumers are not likely to purchase products
known to be unsafe. The manufacturer's tarnished image may also
extend to its other products, having a devastating effect on its overall
economic viability.' 23
118. See Kobayashi, supra note 2, at 545. "[I]t is highly unlikely that such a person or
manufacturer would deliberately fail to take some corrective action merely to come
within the scope of an exclusionary evidentiary rule, particularly in the light of the
liberalized scope of punitive damage awards." Id.
119. See, e.g., Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1993). In Burke, an em-
ployee cut his hand while reaching through the clean-out door of his employer's verti-
cal auger. Id. at 501. The trial judge admitted remedial evidence during the trial and
the jury awarded Burke $50,000,000 in punitive damages. Id. On appeal, however, the
Eighth Circuit reversed the punitive damages award. Id. at 514. Evidence relied on by
the district court was that the manufacturer knew of several accidents caused by the
product, but intentionally delayed repairing the product to save money. Id. at 511-12.
120. MoRRis & MoRRIus, supra note 117. "[Ijnsurance companies that sell products
liability policies also have become more interested in safety; many employ safety engi-
neers whose inspections of factories affect underwriting and retention of risks. These
insurance activities, in turn, induce manufacturers to turn out safer products." Id.; see
also Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., 716 F.2d 1322, 1328 (10th Cir. 1983).
121. Repairs to defective or dangerous products may be mandated by governmental
agencies. RiCHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO Evi-
DENCE 194 n.15 (2d ed. 1982).
122. Id. "[T]he prospect of repeated products liability claims will make immediate
repairs the less costly alternative whatever the current litigation costs." Id.
123. See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 121, at 194 n.15. "[P]erhaps most impor-
tantly, the danger [created by a defective product is] that unfavorable publicity will in-
terfere with sales of non-defective products." Id.
(Vol. 20
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Rule 407 offers tenuous protection. Manufacturers that reject the
economic arguments favoring remedial measures run the risk of falling
prey to any of the exceptions to Rule 407124 which increases the likeli-
hood that evidence of remedial measures will be admissible on other
grounds. 125 Thus, the argument that a manufacturer will consciously
neglect to repair a dangerous product out of fear that Rule 407 may
later apply is both unrealistic and unsupported by empirical
evidence.1 26
B. The Exemptions Swallow the Rule
The clear language of Rule 407 permits the admissibility of evidence
of subsequent remedial measures if offered for a purpose other than to
demonstrate negligence. 127 Despite the rule's unambiguous intent,
some courts argue that the exceptions to Rule 407 apply only to negli-
gence claims; these courts refuse to extend the exceptions to strict lia-
bility situations.12
8
124. FED. R. EVID. 407, supra note 3. Rule 407 does not prohibit evidence of reme-
dial measures "when offered for another purpose." Id.; see also 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 1, 407[02], at 407-15. "Even if the defendant is as cold-blooded as the rule
suggests, his awareness of the many exceptions to the general exclusionary rule would
make it risky to refrain from making the needed repairs." Id.
125. Even in jurisdictions where remedial evidence is excluded in strict liability,
such evidence often is admitted for other reasons. E.g., Ross v. Black & Decker, Inc.,
977 F.2d 1178, 1185 (7th Cir. 1992) (admitting evidence of post-accident safety stan-
dard to show that power saw had a dangerous defect because manufacturer failed to
properly admit to the feasibility of the remedial measures); Pitasi v. Stratton Corp., 968
F.2d 1558, 1560-61 (2d Cir. 1992) (admitting remedial evidence to rebut a defense
based on the nature or condition of the accident scene); Pau v. Yosemite Park & Curry
Co., 928 F.2d 880, 888 (9th Cir. 1991) (admitting remedial evidence against manufac-
turer when remedial steps were conducted by a third party).
126. As one commentator notes:
Whether this rule of exclusion actually affects one's willingness to undertake
remedial steps is problematic and the assumption that it does has been seri-
ously questioned. Arguably, even if the evidence of remedial measures were
admissible, the actor would still make the necessary repairs or take other cor-
rective action. Failure to do so poses for him the risk that another person
would injure himself; furthermore, the second claimant's case would be
strengthened by the fact that the defendant had notice of a possibly danger-
ous condition by reason of the first accident.
GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCrION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5.17, at 172-73 (1987)
(footnote omitted).
127. FED. R. EVID. 407. "This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of
subsequent measures when offered for another purpose . . . ." Id. Therefore, the ex-
ceptions to Rule 407 apply whether the claim is based in negligence or strict liability.
128. See, e.g., Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Cal. 1975)
(arguing that the exceptions carved out of Rule 407 are additional evidence that Rule
407 was intended to apply only to cases of negligence).
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1. Feasibility
The feasibility exception allows the use of remedial evidence to de-
termine whether appropriate design alternatives or safeguards were
possible at the time of the accident.129 If feasibility is at issue or is
controverted by the defendant, remedial evidence is admissible to
prove that an alternative design was possible.t 30 However, courts are
inconsistent when determining whether feasibility is controverted.13 1
Some courts hold that if a manufacturer does not expressly stipulate
that an alternative design is feasible, such feasibility is at issue and the
injured plaintiff may introduce remedial evidence.13 2 For example, in
Ross v. Black & Decker, Inc.,133 a bricklayer's arm was severed while op-
erating an electrical saw.' 3 4 The district court admitted evidence that
the manufacturer added a blade-guard to later models of the saw in
order to meet required safety standards.135 On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit allowed the remedial evidence because the manufacturer com-
mitted a tactical error by failing to stipulate to feasibility of the safety
guards during the pretrial memorandum or motions.13 6 The Ross
court required that feasibility be an explicitly controverted issue at trial
before remedial evidence can be admitted. Consequently, plaintiffs
that successfully invoke the feasibility exception effectively circumvent
129. See Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310, 315 (9th Cir. 1961). The Brown
court admitted evidence of features added to an alternator device after the accident to
show the feasibility of manufacturing the features at the time the questionable alterna-
tor was built. Id.
130. FED. R. EVID. 407. Rule 407 "does not require the exclusion of evidence of
subsequent measures when ... proving ... feasibility of precautionary measures, if
controverted . . . ." Id. Thus, where it is unclear whether an alternative design was
possible or practical, remedial evidence is admissible. E.g., Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead
Co., 729 F.2d 238, 247 n.6 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding admission proper since feasibility
was at issue during trial). But cf Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1523 (lst
Cir. 1991) (excluding remedial evidence because feasibility was not controverted); Mills
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 886 F.2d 758, 763-64 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that feasibility
exception does not apply if feasibility is not controverted).
131. E.g., Donahue v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 866 F.2d 1008, 1013 (8th Cir. 1989)
(admitting remedial evidence under feasibility exception despite manufacturer's con-
tention that it was not feasible to provide warnings). But cf. Wheeler v.John Deere Co.,
935 F.2d 1090, 1098-99 (10th Cir. 1991) (refusing to withdraw an alleged erroneous
stipulation to feasibility made in an earlier trial because the manufacturer's admissions
did not result in manifest injustice).
132. Meller v. Heil Co., 745 F.2d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 1984).
133. 977 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1992).
134. Id. at 1181.
135. Id. at 1182-83.
136. Id. at 1185. The court held that, although the manufacturer stipulated to feasi-
bility during cross-examination, the admission was too late and the remedial evidence
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Rule 407 to admit remedial evidence.1 3 7 Other courts hold that if fea-
sibility is conceded, evidence of subsequent modifications should be
excluded under Rule 407.138
2. Impeachment
Like the feasibility exception, admissibility for impeachment is also
expressly provided under Rule 407.139 This exception is triggered
when a manufacturer testifies, during its case-in-chief, that its actions
were proper and that the product was not dangerous or defective at
the time that injury occurred. 140 The injured plaintiff may then intro-
duce evidence of post-accident safety measures to impeach or contra-
dict the manufacturer's testimony during cross-examination.1 41
A recent Fifth Circuit case effectively demonstrates the significance
of the impeachment exception. In a preemptory declaratory judgment
action, the manufacturer testified that its floating dock system was "one
of the strongest in the world."142 Remedial evidence was admitted to
impeach this testimony since the evidence provided an alternative ex-
planation for the dock's failure. 143 Impeachment is such an effective
and easy method of circumventing Rule 407 that one commentator has
noted that, "given the critical nature of the inquiry, it is not surprising
that most decisions permit impeachment even though the exception
swallows up the rule."144
137. See In reJoint E. Dist. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 995 F.2d 343, 345-46 (2d Cir.
1993). In Joint E. Dist., the court held that the remedial evidence was inadmissible be-
cause feasibility was not directly at issue. The court stated: "'Feasibility' is not an open
sesame whose mere invocation parts Rule 407 and ushers in evidence of subsequent
repairs and remedies." Id. at 345.
138. Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 621 F.2d 715, 721 (5th Cir. 1980).
139. FED. R. Evin. 407. "This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of
subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ... impeach-
ment." Id.
140. E.g., Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Ecodyne Corp., 702 F. Supp 217, 218 (E.D.
Wis. 1988) (admitting remedial evidence for purposes of impeaching defendant's
testimony).
141. Id. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 407.1 (3d ed.
1991). See also Pitasi v. Stratton Corp., 968 F.2d 1558, 1561 (2d Cir. 1992) (admitting
remedial evidence in a negligence action to impeach testimony that the dangerous con-
dition was obvious); Muzyka v. Remington Arms Co., 774 F.2d 1309, 1313 (5th Cir.
1985) (admitting remedial evidence in strict liability action to impeach testimony that a
rifle was promoted as "the premier rifle, the best and the safest rifle of its kind on the
market." (emphasis in original)).
142. Polythane Sys., Inc. v. Marina Ventures Int'l, 993 F.2d 1201, 1211 (5th Cir.
1993).
143. Id.
144. GRAHAM, supra note 141, § 407.1. Graham calls for "either elimination of Rule
407 or amendment to clearly prohibit impeachment." Id. at 271 n.ll. But c.f. Harrison
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 981 F.2d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 1992) (cautioning that the remedial
evidence for indirect impeachment must not be admitted if the nexus between the
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3. Other Exceptions
Rule 407 also expressly permits the use of remedial evidence to de-
termine ownership or control.145 In addition to exceptions specifically
enumerated by Rule 407, plaintiffs frequently take advantage of less
blatant strategic and procedural loopholes. For example, evidence of
remedial measures will be admitted if such measures occurred after
the product was manufactured, but before an accident occurred.a46 A
recent Seventh Circuit case, Traylor v. Husqvarna Motor'4 7 demonstrates
the effectiveness of this exception.
In Traylor, a metal chip from a defective maul struck a worker result-
ing in the loss of his eye.148 The manufacturer conducted tests after
the product was sold, but before any injuries had resulted.149 The tests
proving that the product was defective and dangerous led to improve-
ments in the design of the maul.'5 0 The court admitted evidence of
these remedial measures because it believed that the probative value
outweighed the desirability of encouraging safety measures.15 l
Some courts that generally exclude subsequent remedial measures
are willing to admit evidence that encourages and eventually leads to
the remedial measure.1 52 Investigative safety reports, for example, may
be admitted if they are not deemed to be an actual remedial mea-
testimony to be impeached and the remedial evidence is tenuous or the evidence is a
mere "subterfuge" for proving negligence).
145. Rule 407, 'does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measure
when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, [or] control." FED. R.
EVID. 407.
146. Traylor v. Husqvarna Motor, 988 F.2d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 1993) (reversing trial
court's exclusion of remedial evidence taken after product was sold, but before the
accident); Arceneaux v. Texaco, Inc., 623 F.2d 924, 928 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that
trial court erred by excluding remedial evidence that occurred in 1971 since accident
occurred in 1974); see also Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1524 (1st Cir.
1991) (holding that Rule 407 cannot be applied to modifications that took place prior
to an accident).
147. 988 F.2d 729 (7th Cir. 1993).
148. Id. at 731.
149. Id. at 733.
150. Id.
151. Traylor v. Husqvarna Motor, 988 F.2d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 1993). When admit-
ting this evidence, the court stated:
[I]n deciding how far back to push "event" one must keep in mind the desira-
bility not only of encouraging safety improvements but also of permitting the
finder of fact, here a jury, to consider probative evidence, as the evidence in
question undoubtedly was. The latter consideration weighs more heavily
when the improvements are made before an accident occurs.
Id.
152. E.g., Benitez-Allende v. Alcan Aluminio do Brasil, S.A., 857 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir.
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sure. 153 In Benitez-Allende v. Alcan Aluminio do Brasil,'54 an injured
plaintiff was allowed to introduce a report of the manufacturer's inves-
tigation that documented a product defect and urged a recall of the
defective product.155 The jury was allowed to consider those sections
of the report recommending the product recall; it was not allowed to
view evidence of the recall itself.156 To a jury, this type of quasi-reme-
dial measure likely will have the same effect as admission of the actual
post-accident remedial evidence.
In another First Circuit case similar to Benitez-Allende, an injured
plaintiff was allowed to introduce a post-accident investigation report
which supported his claim that the product was defective at the time of
the accident. 157 The report's findings prompted the defendant to
send its customers an advisory warning of the problems.15s The court
held that the contents of the investigation report were admissible be-
cause, on its face, the report was not a remedial measure.159 The court
excluded, however, evidence of the actual remedial steps taken.160
Although arguably remedial by nature, post-accident tests and re-
ports are generally not excluded if not deemed "actions taken to rem-
edy any flaws or failures." 16 1 In practical effect, however, the evidence
admitted in these situations often is indistinguishable-at least to the
jury-from evidence of the remedial measure itself. Thus, reports
demonstrating that a product is unsafe, although falling short of reme-
dying the defect, may be as incriminating as the actual remedial meas-
ures. 162 Where investigative reports are introduced, exclusion under
Rule 407 serves no practical purpose.
153. See Chase v. General Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 17, 22 (4th Cir. 1988) (allowing
the admission of design changes occurring prior to the manufacture and sale of the
product).
154. 857 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1988).
155. Id. at 33.
156. Id.
157. Prentiss & Carlisle Co. v. Koehring-Waterous Div. of Timbeijack, Inc., 972 F.2d
6, 10 (1st Cir. 1992).
158. Id. at 9.
159. Id. at 9-10.
160. Id.
161. See Dow Chem. Corp. v. Weevil-Cide Co., 897 F.2d 481, 487 (10th Cir. 1990)
(citing Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Bell Helicopters Textron, 805 F.2d 907, 918
(10th Cir. 1986)). The Weevil court stated, "[A]cts which do nothing to make the harm
less likely to occur should not be excluded under Rule 407." Id. Rule 407 does not
exclude the admission of pre-accident acts that do not reduce the probability of harm.
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 5284, at 106-07 (1980 & Supp. 1993).
162. See Kaczmarek v. Allied Chem. Corp., 836 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1987). The Kacz-
marek court allowed admission of pre-accident decisions to implement a safer design,
but did not allow evidence that the decisions were carried out. Id. at 1060. Since the
decision to remedy the product was admissible, "the incremental evidentiary impact of
the fact that the decision was carried out is unlikely to be great." Id.
1994]
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Courts also will admit evidence of post-accident remedial measures
taken by parties other than the manufacturer.163 In Grenada Steel In-
dustries v. Alabama Oxygen Co.,164 the court upheld admission of an al-
ternative design implemented by one of the manufacturer's
competitors after the defendant's product caused an accident.165 The
court reasoned that since the party making the repair was not penal-
ized by admitting the evidence, the policy underlying exclusion under
Rule 407 was not violated.166
Admitting subsequent repairs by parties other than the defendant is
as potent as if the remedy had been conducted by the defendant itself.
For example, Company X, one of two companies that produce the
same product is sued for injuries resulting from a previously undis-
closed defect that results in an injury. In response, both Company X,
and its competitor Company Y, implement remedial measures to cure
the defect. In a jurisdiction that would otherwise exclude remedial
evidence, Company Y's remedial measures may be admitted and used
to prove Company X's liability. Again, exclusion under Rule 407
would serve no practical purpose since the same remedial evidence will
nevertheless be admitted on other grounds.
Evidence of mandatory remedial repairs will be admitted under yet
another exception to the general rule of exclusion.16 7 In Rozier v. Ford
Motor Co.,' 68 the Fifth Circuit held that where a superior authority such
as the government forces a manufacturer to make post-accident re-
pairs, the remedial evidence is admissible. 169 The policy underlying
Rule 407 does not apply in these situations because a manufacturer
cannot be discouraged from making repairs if the repairs are man-
163. Pau v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 888 (9th Cir. 1991) (admitting
otherwise inadmissible remedial evidence in a breach of warranty claim since a non-
defendant will not be inhibited from taking remedial steps if its actions are allowed into
evidence against the defendant); Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695
F.2d 883, 889 (5th Cir. 1983) (allowing otherwise inadmissible evidence conducted by
third party but excluding the evidence on other grounds); see also Lolie v. Ohio Brass
Co., 502 F.2d 741, 744-45 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding otherwise inadmissible evidence of
post-accident repairs admissible since repairs were made by third party).
164. Grenada Steel Indus., 695 F.2d at 889.
165. Id.
166. Id. For example, in Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518 (1st Cir. 1991),
the court reasoned that " [a] nondefendant will not be inhibited from taking remedial
measures if such actions are allowed into evidence against a defendant." Id. at 1524
(citing Causey v. Zinke (In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia), 871 F.2d 812, 816-817 (9th
Cir. 1989).
167. See, e.g., Kociemba v. Searle & Co., 683 F. Supp. 1579, 1581 (D. Minn. 1988)
(stating that the policy of discouraging a tortfeasor from performing remedial measures
is not advanced when the government requires the changes); see also O'Dell v. Hercules,
Inc., 904 F.2d 1194, 1204 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that an exception to Rule 407 exists
if remedial measures are mandated by a superior government authority).
168. 573 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1978).
169. Id. at 1343.
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dated.170 Thus, evidence that the manufacturer was required to rem-
edy a defective product provides plaintiffs with yet another opportunity
to circumvent Rule 407 exclusion.
A less prevalent exception, available in the Second Circuit, allows
remedial evidence to be introduced into trial for purposes of acquaint-
ing the jury with the accident scene.171 In Lebrecht v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp.,172 the plaintiff introduced photographs taken after the accident
which indicated that subsequent repairs were made.173 The judge ad-
mitted the evidence, but instructed the jury to ignore the subsequent
remedial measures.1 74 The practical effect of this ruling is admission
of the remedial evidence itself.
In light of the ease and effectiveness by which plaintiffs can sidestep
exclusion under Rule 407, product manufacturers can never be certain
whether exclusion will apply and what effect it will have at trial.
Although the law is somewhat more predictable in negligence actions,
the exceptions to Rule 407 provide little guidance for the manufac-
turer considering whether to repair a defective product. The absence
of fault-finding in strict liability actions renders the rule virtually inef-
fectual to product manufacturers.175 Rule 407 should be uniformly in-
applicable in these actions to provide manufacturers some greater
measure of certainty.
C. The Phantom Problems of Relevancy and Danger of Unfair Prejudice
Proponents of Rule 407's exclusionary effect argue that evidence of
remedial measures is irrelevant. The legal elements supporting a
claim of negligence differ markedly from those supporting a cause of
action for strict liability.176 As a result, determining whether the same
piece of evidence would be relevant to either claim requires a separate
analysis for each. Where negligence arises from unreasonable conduct
that breaches a duty of care, strict liability is imposed even where the
170. Id.
171. Pitasi v. Stratton Corp., 968 F.2d 1558, 1560-61 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that
subsequent remedial measures are "admissible to rebut a defense based upon the na-
ture or condition of the accident scene").
172. 402 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1968).
173. Id. at 592.
174. Id.
175. Strict liability is not an action based upon the manufacturer's fault; the action
centers on whether the product was defective. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, § 99, at
695.
176. See Matthew L. Kimball, The Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Strict
Liability Actions: Some Suggestions Regarding Federal Rule of Evidence 407, 39 WASH. & LEE L.
lEv. 1415, 1416 (1982). The author states that, "most commentators agree that the
general exclusion of subsequent repair evidence in negligence actions is sound." Id. at
1416 (citation omitted). However, strict tort liability does not require a showing of
fault, "and stands on proof and policy considerations significantly different from those
supporting a negligence theory." Id. (citations omitted).
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seller has exercised "all possible care" in the preparation and sales of
its product.177 Remedial evidence, therefore, is more relevant in strict
liability actions than in negligence actions.1
7 8
Before it is admitted into trial, evidence must be demonstrated to be
relevant.1 7 9 Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a conse-
quential fact more or less probable.1 8 0 Therefore, conduct that occurs
after an alleged incident of negligence is irrelevant because negligence
rests on affirmative conduct that either creates danger or fails to take
reasonable steps to avoid danger.a18 Once the culpable conduct is
complete, it necessarily follows that the negligent incident has
terminated.
In effect, the fact finder in a negligence action works from a position
of hindsight.182 Thus, in a negligence action, exclusion under Rule
407 is proper since a determination of liability focuses on the reasona-
bleness of the defendant's conduct at the time of the event.183 Steps
taken after the event are appropriately excluded since they are only
marginally relevant to show that a product was unsafe at the time of
the manufacturer's conduct. 18
4
Unlike its role in negligence actions, evidence of remedial measures
is relevant to strict liability actions because conduct at the time of the
incident is not controlling;1 85 liability attaches if a product is defective
when sold and reaches the consumer in an unchanged condition.186
The fact-finder is not required to consider whether a duty is breached
but rather must determine whether the manufacturer placed a defec-
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2) (a) (1965).
178. FED. R. EVID. 407. As the advisory committee's note states, conduct that may be
classified as a remedial measure is not necessarily an admission of fault, however
"[u]nder a liberal theory of relevancy this ground alone would not support exclusion as
the inference is still a possible one." Id. advisory committee's note supra note 3. See
infra notes 197-198.
179. FED. R. EVID. 402. The rule provides: "All relevant evidence is admissible, ex-
cept as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress,
by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." Id.
180. FED. R. EVID. 401. Rule 401 provides: "'Relevant Evidence' means evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence." Id.
181. Columbia & Puget Sound R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202 (1982); Caprara v.
Chrysler Corp., 417 N.E.2d 545, 549 (N.Y. 1981).
182. Caprara, 417 N.E.2d at 549.
183. Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., 716 F.2d 1322, 1327 (10th Cir. 1983).
184. Id.
185. In strict liability, courts focus on the time when the product was sold and when
the product reaches the consumer. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965).
186. Strict liability requires that the product be in a defective condition when sold
and that it reaches the consumer in a substantially unchanged condition. Id
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tive product in the stream of commerce.' 8 7 In the case of dangerous
products, liability attaches irrespective of the defendant's conduct.188
Since the defendant's fault is not at issue, problems of relevance are
circumvented and evidence of remedial conduct after the product en-
ters the marketplace may be relevant to show a defect. Thus, remedial
evidence is relevant in strict liability actions because it tends to show
that it was more probable than not that the product in question was
defective at the time it was purchased.l89
The second argument offered in support of excluding remedial evi-
dence is that it may create undue prejudice to the defendant.190 But,
even relevant evidence may be excluded under Rule 403 if the proba-
tive value of evidence is "substantially outweighed by the danger of un-
fair prejudice."19 1 Prejudice can result in negligence actions if a jury
relies too heavily on post-accident conduct when assessing liability.l92
When faced with persuasive evidence of post-accident measures, the
fact-finder may neglect its duty to focus solely on conduct at the time
of the alleged negligence.193 Instead, the jury might wrongly infer that
a defendant's subsequent remedial conduct is an admission of
liability.' 9 4
This concern is clearly addressed in the advisory committee's note to
Rule 407: "Exclusion is called for only when the evidence of subse-
187. The traditional elements required to prove negligence are the defendant's duty
of due care, breach of that duty, damages suffered as a result of the breach, and that the
damages were proximately caused by the breach. Moius & MoRus, supra note 117, at
44. In a strict liability claim, the product must be proven to be defective at the time the
manufacturer sent it to the market. Id. at 240. Unlike in a negligence claim, a manu-
facturer may be strictly liable for a product that causes injury even though the product
conforms to accepted standards of safety. Id. at 241.
188. Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., 716 F.2d 1322, 1327 (10th Cir. 1983). The
court determined that Rule 407's exclusion is inappropriate because society has de-
cided that defendants who pursue certain activities should be strictly liable for damages.
Id.
189. See FED. R. EVID. 402.
190. See FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note, supra note 3.
191. FED. R. EVID. 403. Rule 403 provides: -"Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id.
192. The trier of fact must rely on conduct at the time of the alleged negligence
when assessing liability. Columbia & Puget Sound R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207
(1892). Prejudice may Arise, for example, where liability is assessed primarily on actions
taken after the alleged negligence rather than at the time of the incident. Rule 403
excludes relevant evidence if its "probative value is substantially outweighed by the dan-
ger of unfair prejudice." FED. R. EVID. 403.
193. Unfair prejudice may result where the jury draws inferences such as, "[i]f it
wasn't broken or bad, why did the defendant(s) fix it?" Kobayashi, supra note 2, at 509.
194. See Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518 (1st Cir. 1991). In the case of
dangerous products, "[ilt was thought that jurors would too readily equate subsequent
design modifications with admissions of a prior defective design." Id. at 1523.
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quent remedial measures is offered as proof of negligence or culpable
conduct ... [the rule] rejects the suggested inference that fault is ad-
mitted."195 This language suggests that Rule 407 excludes remedial
evidence in negligence actions because fault might be inferred from a
defendant's post-accident conduct. Imposing liability by inference,
without a direct showing of fault, is unfairly prejudicial to a defendant
attempting to disprove negligence.
Concerns of unfair prejudice also arise in strict liability claims, but to
a lesser degree. In strict liability actions, fault, by definition, is im-
posed upon a defendant who places a dangerous product on the mar-
ket.196 Thus, prejudicial harm that may befall the defendant
evaporates because conduct is no longer the basis for finding liabil-
ity.197 On the other hand, the probative value of remedial evidence is
stronger than it would be in negligence claims because fixing a danger-
ous product suggests that the product was previously defective. 198 The
probative value of remedial evidence in product liability claims is fur-
ther enhanced by the demands of public policy; society has chosen to
place responsibility for harm caused by dangerous products on the
shoulders of the manufacturers. 19 9
Rule 407 unambiguously limits its exclusionary effect. The probative
value of remedial evidence may be substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice when the defendant's conduct at the time of the accident is
at issue. Thus, the rule supports exclusion in negligence claims. But,
when a sequence of events unrelated to the defendant's conduct is at
issue, as it is in product liability claims, probative value rarely if ever is
outweighed by unfair prejudice. 200
For the above-stated reasons, dangers of unfair prejudice do not
weigh as heavily in strict liability claims as they do in negligence ac-
195. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note supra note 3.
196. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Liability for physical harm is
imposed despite the fact that a manufacturer has "exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product." Id.
197. The determination of liability focuses on whether the product was dangerous.
Id.
198. Some commentators argue that the probative value of post-accident remedial
measures is questionable since "the conduct and reason for the subsequent remedial
measure may be equally consistent with mere invention, serendipity, or even extraordi-
nary care or overabundance of caution." Kobayashi, supra note 2, at 509.
In the unlikely event that any of the above reasons were actually determinative in a
manufacturer's decision to fix a product after it causes an injury, the trial judge would
exercise his or her discretion to exclude the evidence under Rule 403 rather than Rule
407. See FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note supra note 3.
199. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A cmt. c (1965); see also Caprara v.
Chrysler Corp., 417 N.E.2d 545, 549 (N.Y. 1981).
200. The critical sequence of events in strict liability includes the time when the
product is sold until it reaches the consumer in a substantially unchanged condition.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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tions. Problems of unfair prejudice may also arise in strict liability ac-
tions, but in these instances, rules other than 407 more appropriately
resolve them.2 01
D. More Appropriate Rules Exist for Resolving Problems of Admissibility
Rules 401, 402, and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence assess the
admissibility of remedial evidence in strict products liability claims
more effectively and consistently than Rule 407. Under Rule 402, evi-
dence that is not relevant is inadmissible.202 Rule 401 defines rele-
vance as the tendency to make any consequential fact more or less
probable. 203 Evidence of a subsequent change in the manufacturing
process is relevant and has substantial "probative value because a busi-
ness is not likely to change a product unless the change promotes
safety and is feasible."204 Therefore, in strict liability actions, evidence
of subsequent remedial measures is relevant because it allows the jury
to infer from the measures that the product was originally defective.205
Nevertheless, proponents of exclusion argue that remedial evidence is
irrelevant not only to claims of negligence, but in strict liability as
well.
2 0 6
Arguably, the relevance of remedial evidence may be called into
question where the reasons why a manufacturer changed a product are
uncertain.207 In these instances, courts should apply the same analysis
that would be triggered by any other question of relevance. The rele-
vance standards set forth in Rules 401 and 402 specifically determine
the admissibility of relevant evidence. Excluding evidence as irrelevant
under Rule 407-in effect sidestepping the rigors of Rules 401 and
402-is improper and unduly excludes evidence that otherwise would
be admissible under these rules.208
201. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note supra note 3. Rule 403 specifically
permits the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence if its "probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." FED. R. EvID. 403. See supra note
191 for text of the rule.
202. FED. R. EVID. 402. See supra note 179 for text of rule.
203. FED. R. EvID. 401. See supra note 180 for text of rule.
204. Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 887 (5th Cir. 1983)
(citing R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 189 (1977)).
205. "Under the liberal theory of relevancy embodied in Rule 401, the circumstan-
tial evidence of repair would have force sufficient to support admission." 2 WEINSTEIN
& BERGER, supra note 1, 407[02], at 407-14.
206. Grenada Steel Indus. 695 F.2d. at 886.
207. See Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., 716 F.2d 1322, 1327 (10th Cir. 1983).
For example, "[a] person may have exercised all the care which the law required, and
yet, in light of his new experience, after an unexpected accident has occurred, and as a
measure of extreme caution, he may adopt additional safeguards." Morse v. Minneapo-
lis & St. Louis Ry., 30 Minn. 465, 468 (1883) (deciding action was based in negligence,
not strict liability).
208. See supra notes 178-179.
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Not all relevant evidence will be admitted. The "probative value"
balancing test required by Federal Rule of Evidence 403 works to ex-
clude evidence if it poses danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant,
confusion of issues, or misleading of the jury.209 Remedial evidence is
rarely prejudicial in strict liability claims, but conceivably could con-
fuse or mislead the jury where the sole issue in controversy arises from
events that occurred at the time of the accident.2 10 Thus, the evidence
of subsequent occurrences may prejudice the defendant by focusing
jurors' attention on an irrelevant time-frame. 2 n1 When dangers of
prejudice, confusion, or being misleading arise in strict liability ac-
tions, the exclusion of remedial evidence should be determined under
Rule 403. Blind application of Rule 407, which was designed to ad-
dress problems of prejudice in negligence actions, unnecessarily ex-
cludes nonprejudicial evidence.
Commentators support this solution and propose that all questions
of prejudicial remedial evidence in strict liability claims be addressed
under Rule 403 rather than Rule 407.212 This approach would allow
the judge to consider the specific circumstances of each case and bal-
ance probative value of questionable evidence against potential preju-
dice to the defendant.2 1 3 Further support for applying Rule 403 in
these situations is unambiguously expressed in the advisory commit-
tee's note, which provides that "the factors of undue prejudice, confu-
sion of issues, misleading the jury, and waste of time remain for
consideration under Rule 403."214
The Eighth Circuit, which generally admits remedial evidence in
strict liability actions, will exclude such evidence where Rule 401, 402,
or 403 issues arise.2 1 5 In Burke v. Deere & Co., the court found evidence
of remedial measures to be relevant to prove strict liability; nonethe-
less, the evidence was excluded because it was irrelevant to the manu-
facturer's "bad conduct" for which punitive damages were being
sought.2 1
6
In another Eighth Circuit decision, a worker recovering from sur-
gery was injured when his walking cane broke, causing him to fall
down a staircase. 2 17 The cane was subsequently misplaced, so the
209. FED. R. Evln. 403.
210. Hendon, 716 F.2d at 1327.
211. See id.
212. 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 1, 1407[02], at 407-23; see also Cook v. Navis-
tar Int'l Transp. Corp., 940 F.2d 207, 214 (7th Cir. 1991) (excluding evidence under
Rule 403 rather than 407 where unfair prejudice was at issue).
213. See id.
214. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note, supra note 3.
215. See Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1993); Bizzle v. McKesson Corp.,
961 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1992).
216. Burke, 6 F.3d at 507.
217. Bizzle v. McKesson Corp., 961 F.2d 719, 720 (8th Cir. 1992).
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plaintiff introduced pictures of it during trial and attempted to intro-
duce evidence that the manufacturer had recalled a particular model
of the cane after learning of the lawsuit.218 The court noted the ab-
sence of convincing evidence that the cane which caused the injury was
the same model as the cane subsequently recalled. Thus, the remedial
evidence was properly excluded under Rule 403 because its probative
value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.219
The evidentiary approach adopted by the Eighth Circuit allows the
trial judge to consider the peculiarities of each case; it is a workable
and effective method for addressing problems of admissibility if such
problems arise.220 Blanket exclusion under Rule 407 is unwarranted
where rules that specifically address the admission of problematic re-
medial evidence are available and effective.221
Concerns regarding prejudice may also be circumvented under Rule
105222 which allows admission of subsequent remedial evidence, sub-
ject to a limited purpose instruction.2 23 Although such an instruction
may still threaten prejudice, the drafters of Rule 407 must have be-
lieved that juries are capable of understanding limited uses of remedial
evidence; otherwise the Rule 407 exceptions would not exist or Rule
105 would not have been adopted.22 4 In sum, better rules than Rule
407 exist for addressing procedural problems that may occasionally
arise where remedial evidence is used in a strict liability trial.
E. The Ambiguous Limits of Rule 407
The history and clear language of Rule 407 indicate that it was
designed to apply to negligence claims rather than strict liability ac-
tions. The advisory committee's note explains the rule's scope: exclu-
sion under the rule is appropriate only when the remedial evidence "is
offered as proof of negligence or culpable conduct."22 5 This limited
scope of applicability is further supported by the rule's origin: the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence were drafted as a codification of common law
218. Id. at 721.
219. Id.
220. See Cook v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 940 F.2d 207, 214-15 (7th Cir. 1991)
(excluding remedial evidence under Rule 403 rather than 407).
221. Id.
222. FED. R. EvD. 105. Rule 105 provides: "When evidence which is admissible as to
one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another
purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper
scope and instruct the jury accordingly." Id. This rule works well "where the risk of
prejudice is less serious." FED. R. EVID. 105 advisory committee's note.
223. See Rimkus v. Northwest Colorado Ski Corp., 706 F.2d 1060, 1066 (10th Cir.
1983).
224. See Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1984).
225. FED. R. EVD. 407 advisory committee's note, supra note 3.
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principles.226 Specifically, Rule 407 emerged from the "conventional
doctrine which excludes subsequent remedial measures as proof of an
admission of fault.' 22
7
Nowhere does Rule 407 or the advisory committee's note state or
imply that the common law exclusionary doctrine encompassed activi-
ties beyond fault or culpability. 228 Negligence, not strict liability,
formed the basis for Rule 407 application. 22 9 Thus, the rule stands
only for the proposition that conduct cannot be an admission of fault
when that conduct may be equally consistent with injury by mere acci-
dent or through contributory negligence.
230
Early interpretations of Rule 407 neglected to differentiate between
negligence and strict liability when excluding remedial evidence.231
The unfortunate result of this lack of analytical foresight was unwar-
ranted expansion of Rule 407 to strict liability claims. Negligence and
strict liability, however, are very different causes of action; distinguish-
ing between them is essential when determining whether to exclude
remedial evidence under an express, plain meaning interpretation of
Rule 407.232
One possible explanation for such unchallenged expansion of Rule
407 to strict liability lies in judicial confusion over the appropriate
analysis to be applied in strict liability actions. Strict liability requires
that a product be unreasonably dangerous and reach the consumer in
a substantially unchanged condition.23 3 Some authorities contend
that the analysis for determining "unreasonably dangerous" is similar
whether the cause of action lies in negligence, strict liability, or breach
226. See supra note 49. In fact, the advisory committee's note refers practitioners to
the California Evidence Code § 1151 as a comparable rule. FED. R EVID. 407 advisory
committee's note, supra note 3. According to its drafters, § 1151 was "intended to
merely codify 'well-settled law.'" Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148,
1151 (Cal. 1974) (citing the Law Revision committee's comment to § 1151 of the Cali-
fornia Evidence Code).
227. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note, supra note 3.
228. See id.
229. See Columbia & Puget Sound RR. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202 (1892); see also
supra note 49. The advisory committee's note states that Rule 407 is based on the con-
ventional doctrine that proof of conduct is not an admission of fault. FED. R. EVID. 407
advisory committee's note, supra note 3 (citing Hart v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry., 21
L.T.R. N.S. 261, 263 (1869), an action based in negligence).
230. FED. R. EviD. 407. The advisory committee's note quotes Baron Bramwell to
demonstrate Rule 407's rejection of the notion that "because the world gets wiser as it
gets older, therefore it was foolish before." Id. advisory committee's note, supra note 3.
231. See Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230, 235 (6th Cir.
1980).
232. See Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 467 (7th Cir. 1984).
233. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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of warranty. 23 4 One court, for example, justified applying the exclu-
sionary rule to strict liability actions on the ground that "the test for an
unreasonably dangerous condition is equivalent to a negligence stan-
dard" of unreasonable conduct.235 Such over-generalization fails to
appreciate important distinctions between negligence and strict liabil-
ity, distinctions that underscore the inappropriateness of excluding re-
medial evidence from strict liability actions.
A manufacturer that could not have reasonably been expected to
discover a product defect through testing or inspection will not be lia-
ble under a negligence theory. 23 6 That same manufacturer, however,
would be subject to strict liability.23 7 This occurs because a cause of
action in negligence arises only where a defendant breaches a required
duty of care. 23 8 Strict liability, in contrast, will result despite the de-
fendant's exercise of all possible due care.23 9 Because of the distinc-
tion between strict liability and negligence-specifically the critical
role of culpability in the latter-application of the same analysis for
both causes of action is an unwarranted expansion of Rule 407 in light
of the rule's express language.
F. The Social Policies Supporting a Strict Liability Claim Require the
Admission of Post-Accident Evidence
The law of strict liability emerged and evolved to guarantee that lia-
bility for injuries resulting from defective products vests with manufac-
turers rather than with vulnerable consumers. 240 In order to achieve
the law's social purpose, therefore, strict liability must not be bur-
dened by procedural barriers. In fact, such barriers actively contra-
vene the history of the strict liability doctrine; since its inception, the
law of strict liability has operated to alleviate problems of proof for-
merly faced by injured consumers.24 1
234. WiuLim L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 671 (4th ed. 1971). The
proof required in actions resulting from unsafe products is largely the same whether
the cause of action is negligence, strict liability, or breach of warranty. Id.
235. Birchfield v. International Harvester Co., 726 F.2d 1131, 1139 (6th Cir. 1984).
236. See Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 467.
237. Id. For purposes of differentiating between negligence and strict liability, the
same analysis applies for failure to warn. Id. Likewise, in a claim based on failure to
warn, a manufacturer with no reason to know of a product danger would not be negli-
gent for failing to warn of the danger, but may nevertheless be strictly liable with tort.
Id.
238. Id. at 468.
239. Id.
240. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 277 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963).
241. Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 417 N.E.2d 545, 550 (N.Y. 1981).
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Strict liability specifically eases the plaintiff's evidentiary burdens re-
garding scienter and defectiveness. Scienter, 242 although indispensa-
ble in negligence actions, is not required in strict liability claims.24
3
Instead, the law presumes that the manufacturer knew about the dan-
gerous condition of the product.244 Thus, absent knowledge of a prod-
uct defect, a manufacturer will not be liable under a negligence
theory, but would be held strictly liable. 245 Furthermore, if a plaintiff
is unable to prove by direct evidence that a product is defective, a strict
liability defect may be inferred if other probable causes are ruled
out.246 Excluding proof of remedial measures, therefore, is inconsis-
tent with the trends and underlying policies of strict liability law that
ease, rather than impede the plaintiffs burden of proof.
2 47
Although this theory supports admissibility in practice, most courts
exclude remedial evidence, invoking the traditional policy arguments
even though such policies are clearly not advanced by exclusion. For
242. Scienter refers to the actor's state of mind. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1345 (6th
ed. 1990).
The term is used in pleading to signify an allegation . . . setting out the de-
fendant's previous knowledge of the cause which led to the injury complained
of, or rather his previous knowledge of a state of facts which it was his duty to
guard against, and his omission to do which has led to the injury complained
of. The term is frequently used to signify the defendant's guilty knowledge.
Id.
243. Caprara, 417 N.E.2d at 549-50.
244. See John W. Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L.
REv. 551, 567 (1980). The author suggests that an important distinguishing feature of
strict liability is that "whether a reasonable prudent manufacturer would put the prod-
uct or the market must be made with the assumption that the manufacturer knew of the
dangerous condition of the product." Id. at 567.
245. In Faminio, Judge Posner recognized,
[W] hen the defect is in a component and the manufacturer of the final prod-
uct could not reasonably have been expected to discover the defect by inspect-
ing or testing the component, the manufacturer would not be liable under a
negligence regime for the defect, but under strict liability he would be.
733 F.2d at 467.
246. See Halloran v. Virginia Chems. Inc., 393 N.Y.S.2d 341, 343 (1977). In this
case, a mechanic was injured when a can of refrigerant exploded. Id. at 343. The man-
ufacturer argued that a prima facie showing of defect was lacking since no particular
defect in the refrigerant was ever established. Id. The court found that the issue "mer-
its little discussion," since in a product liability case, if a plaintiff excludes all causes
other than those attributable to the manufacturer, even if the defect has not been
proven, the fact-finder may infer that the accident was caused by a defect in the product
or in its packing. Id. (citations omitted).
247. See Caprara, 417 N.E.2d at 550. In Caprara, Judge Fuchsberg highlighted the
argument:
This contrast between negligence and strict products liability law is dramatic
... the logic behind the exclusionary rule... affords little, if any, support for
the slavish application of the rule to cases brought on a legal theory so anti-
thetical to the strictures of negligence law ....
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example, in Raymond v. Raymond Corp.,248 the operator of a tractor was
killed when a steel beam pierced the operator's compartment and
struck him.249 Prior to the fatal accident, the manufacturer planned to
add steel backplates and more secure welding to prevent the known
propensity for such accidents. 250 In fact, after the accident, the manu-
facturer incorporated the safer design into later models of the trac-
tor.251 On review, the court asserted Rule 407's goal to "further the
social policy of encouraging manufacturers to create safer prod-
ucts."252 The evidence was thus excluded from trial. The court up-
held the jury verdict that the product was not unreasonably
dangerous, 253 despite the fact that the manufacturer knew that the
tractor was dangerous, planned on fixing the tractor prior to its sale,
and actually remedied the tractor after the accident.
25 4
Exclusion contravenes every policy underpinning the law of strict lia-
bility: manufacturers of dangerous products must be strictly accounta-
ble for any resulting injuries.255 Exclusion cannot rest on a court's
purported desire to encourage manufacturers to create safer products.
A safer design was admittedly necessary in Raymond and was, in fact,
already being implemented at the time of the accident. The court's
decision, therefore, would likely have had no effect on Raymond Cor-
poration's decision to remedy the defect. Raymond exemplifies the un-
just effect of relying on unsupported policy assumptions when
excluding evidence under Rule 407. The effect, in that case, was to
deny recovery where an admittedly dangerous product caused the
death of an unsuspecting consumer.
IV. CONCLUSION
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 originated as a codification of deci-
sions involving negligence and culpable conduct.2 56 Exclusion under
Rule 407 is therefore justified in negligence actions because measures
taken after the conduct in question are not relevant to conduct at the
time of the accident. Strict liability actions, on the other hand, do not
require that the defendant's conduct be directly related to the acci-
dent. Instead, society has determined that a manufacturer who places
a dangerous product into the marketplace must bear the loss from in-
248. 938 F.2d 1518 (Ist Cir. 1991).
249. Id. at 1520.
250. Id. at 1523. Before the tractor was manufactured, design modifications were on
the "drawing board." Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1521 (1st Cir. 1991).
254. Id. at 1523.
255. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, supra note 40.
256. Supra, note 49.
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juries caused by that product. Thus, excluding remedial evidence is
contrary to public policy in strict liability claims.
Federal courts are inconsistent in their application of Rule 407 to
strict liability claims. Inconsistent laws result in uncertainty and une-
ven application of evidentiary rules that were designed to achieve con-
sistency.2 57 Arguments supporting exclusion bear little relation to the
reality of product manufacturing. There is no evidence that admitting
remedial evidence would discourage manufacturers from implement-
ing safety measures. Furthermore, competent attorneys can and gen-
erally do qualify the evidence under one of the many strategic and
procedural exemptions to the rule. Rule 407 was never intended to
apply in strict liability. Applying the rule in strict liability actions more
often than not produces unfair results that are contrary to public pol-
icy. Expansion of Rule 407 to exclude remedial evidence in strict lia-
bility is therefore unwarranted.
Brent R. Johnson
257. See Kimball, supra note 176, at 1416-17.
Without uniform court treatment of repair evidence in strict liability actions,
producers and manufacturers defending strict liability claims find their prod-
ucts assessed differently from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The disparate treat-
ment of subsequent repair evidence is anomalous when a stated purpose of
the Federal Rules of Evidence is fairness in the administration of evidence law,
and the legislative intent is uniformity of evidence rules used in the federal
circuits.
Id. (footnotes omitted). As one commentator notes, "There is nothing to be gained by
leaving this question open for further judicial resolution, other than an incentive for
forum shopping.., and a consequent expenditure ofjudicial resources." Margaret A.
Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the Goals of Codication, 12
HOFSTRA L. REV. 255, 266 (1984).
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